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Nebraska Home Rule:, The Record
and Some Recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal home rule is a rearrangement of the American state-
municipal relationship which increases the legal authority of cities
over local affairs and reduces state legislative control.1 Home rule
is a movement toward federalization of the traditional state-local
relationship; but it has thus far not undermined the essentially
unitary character of American state government.2 Municipal home
rule can be conferred by constitution or statute. Constitutional
home rule gives cities protection against state legislative intrusion
into proscribed areas of local affairs, while statutory home rule de-
pends on the current legislative mood. The state governing body
may delegate a vast amount of authority to home rule cities at one
legislative session and retrieve some of that delegated authority at
the next legislative meeting.
The underlying philosophy of municipal home rule is the notion
that local self-government prospers when local problems are
solved by those who are most familiar with both the problems and
the alternative methods of settling them. Municipal home rule
also offers promise of benefit to the state as a whole: if a legisla-
ture enacts many laws for many local units of government, home
rule could provide that legislature additional time which could be
used for consideration of weightier matters of statewide concern.
Missouri was the first state to initiate home rule-in 1875.3 Con-
stitutional home rule came to Nebraska in 1912, an action which
* Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska; A.B., 1947, Emory Uni-
versity; M.S., 1948, University of Denver; Ph.D., 1955, Duke University.
1. In a few states, home rule is also authorized for counties. See 1 McQuuLm,
TH LAW OF MUNICPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.25 (3d ed. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (Moody, J.):
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, cre-
ated as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them .... The number,
nature and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations
and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the abso-
lute discretion of the State.
3. See J. McGoLDicic, LAw AND PRACTiCE OF MumciPAL HOME RuLE 1916-1930,
5-6 (1933).
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brought to twelve the total number of home rule states in the na-
tion that year.4 Since then the number of home rule states has
increased to over forty.5
The constitutional home rule provisions adopted by the first
group of states (1875-1912) were quite similar: all established
home rule through the use of a specific charter document, and all
provided for voter approval of the charter.6 Michigan, Minnesota
and Texas required implementary state legislative action to set up
home rule, but the other state constitutions allowed cities to frame
charters on a "self-executing" basis without legislative interven-
tion.7 Only California required legislative approval of individual
city charters. 8 In Arizona and Oklahoma (whose home rule provi-
sions are nearly identical), the governor has power to approve or
disapprove each charter commission's finished product.9
II. THE NEBRASKA HOME RULE EXPERIENCE:
SUMMARY
Five years passed after the adoption of the constitutional provi-
sion allowing home rule before any Nebraska cities took advantage
of the option. The city of Lincoln was the first, in 1917; Omaha fol-
lowed in 1922; and Grand Island became the third home rule city in
1928. In 1963, Grand Island abandoned home rule and reorganized
under the "city manager plan."' 0 At present, Lincoln and Omaha
are the only home rule cities, although approximately thirty others
are constitutionally eligible."
Examination of the basic working relationships of municipal
government under exclusive control of a legislative body and
under home rule is a prerequisite to understanding the develop-
ment of Nebraska home rule. As is true of all American municipali-
ties, Nebraska cities are set up in pursuance of state legislative
acts which: (1) describe qualifications for incorporation, (2) pre-
4. These were: Missouri, 1875; Washington, 1889; California, 1896; Minnesota,
1898; Oregon, 1906; Oklahoma, 1907; Texas, 1909; Arizona, 1910; and Colorado,
Michigan, Ohio and Nebraska, 1912. See J. McGOLDRICK, supra note 3, for a
detailed account of the development of home rule.
5. THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 28-54 (1972).
6. ARiz. CONST. art. XfI, §§ 1-6; CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, §§ 6-8 (as amended
1896, 1902, 1911, 1914); COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1-6; MICH. CONST. of 1908, art.
VIII, §§ 21-25; MImN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 36 (1896); Mo. CONST. of 1875, art.
M §§ 7, 16-25; NEB. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 2-5; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-14;
OKLA. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1-7; OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2; TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5;
WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10-11.
7. See note 6 supra.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-601 to -662 (Reissue 1977).
11. There are approximately 30 cities with a population of over 5,000. NEBRASKA
BLUE BOOK 1974-1975, 787.
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scribe precise procedures to be used by communities desiring in-
corporation, and (3) grant authority for the formation of municipal
structures and the performance of various functions.12 The day-to-
day work of municipal government is in the hands of: (1) the
elected city council whose major task is the translation of munici-
pal policy into ordinances; and (2) the .miayor and other officials
who administer the laws passed by the council. The body of state
law by which the mayor and council is governed is sometimes
called a statutory charter.
Nebraska cities working under home rule charters are governed
by a more complicated set of legal relationships. 13 There are, to be
12. See 2 McQumUN, supra note 1, § 9.06.
13. As a Nebraska city cannot have home rule status unless it has population of
at least 5,000, the residents of a city must wait until the city is large enough to
enjoy home rule status. In some states, for example, Iowa, Kansas and South
Dakota, municipalities can acquire home rule status from the initial incorpo-
ration time with no population minimum to be eligible for home rule. See
IOWA CONsT. art. M § 38A; KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
These relationships are illustrated by the following.
Lincoln City Charter Law Components
CHARTER PROVISIONS MUST LIE WITHIN
A.B. Winter, Special Report: Charter Facts at a Glance-For Lincoln Citizens, in
G.R.I. Bulletin (March 1965). Note: if R.S. '43, Ch. 14 is substituted, this graphic
applies identically to Omaha.
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sure, no essential differences between the tasks of the mayor and
the municipal administration in home rule and non-home rule cit-
ies. But in the legislative area, home rule raises a number of addi-
tional problems, especially for a conscientious city council. These
additional problems stem from the fact that Nebraska statutory
and common law require that home rule cities be governed not
only in pursuance of their home rule charter texts, but also in pur-
suance of state legislative acts which remain as a residuum from
their statutory charters. Therefore, when city council members
are faced with the job of drafting legislation, they must search the
texts of both state statutes and their home rule charter to ensure
that they do not stray into illegal areas.
The constitutional provision authorizing home rule contains a
list of permissible legislative subjects in some states,14 but not in
Nebraska. Thus, the city councils of Nebraska home rule cities
must examine each proposed subject of legislation to determine
whether it is constitutionally permissible.
Nebraska non-home rule cities: their charters, ordinances,
structures and functions are all monitored by the courts, but their
essential features are not determined primarily by the judiciary.
The reverse is true of Nebraska home rule cities: their charters,
ordinances, structures and functions have largely been fashioned
according to specifications dictated by the state judiciary. This
phenomenon, which might be labelled "judicial determinism," has
developed because the courts have been asked to determine
whether a home rule charter clause or a state statutory section is
the proper authority for a home rule city ordinance. Judicial deci-
sions have, almost without exception, turned on the pivotal ques-
tion: "Is the subject a matter of local, or a matter of statewide,
concern?" If it is a matter of local concern, the home rule charter is
the authority; if the subject is of statewide concern, then the legis-
lative act will prevail. As the litigation record of more than sixty
years shows, the development of Nebraska home rule has been
controlled by the judicial process. In short, knowledge and under-
standing of Nebraska home rule depends almost totally upon the
study of judicial opinions rather than statutory or home rule char-
ter texts.
Accordingly, this article includes selected information and data
on charter and statutory textual materials; but the most significant
portion of the text is devoted to the work of Nebraska courts. A
14. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; OR. CONsT. art. XI, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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short description of Kansas home rule is offered as another model
for those interested in considering changes in the Nebraska sys-
tem.
III. THE NEBRASKA HOME RULE CHARTER AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT
Sections two through four of article XI of the Nebraska Consti-
tution set forth the procedures by which cities with populations
over 5,000 may create home rule charters and amend or extinguish
them if the electors so desire. 15 An amendment was added in 1920,
specifically authorizing cities of over 100,000 population to "adopt"
their statutory charter as a home rule charter. 6 The substantive
language authorizing constitutional home rule is very brief. It
states:
Any city having a population of more than five thousand (5000) inhabit-
ants may frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and sub-
ject to the constitution and laws of this state .... 17
... No charter or charter amendment adopted under the provisions of
this amendment shall be amended or repealed except by electoral vote.
15. In order to form a charter, the city council must call a special election or use
the occasion of a general election to elect fifteen freeholders, who must have
been qualified electors for five years, to serve as members of a home rule
charter convention. No more than four months after election of its members
the convention must meet and draft a charter. The document is then signed
by the officers and members of the convention and delivered to the city clerk.
In turn, the clerk publishes the draft charter in either an official city paper or,
if none exists, in a newspaper of general circulation. The charter must be
published three times, at one week intervals. The charter must then be voted
upon by the municipal electorate not more than thirty days after the last pub-
lication date. A simple majority of those voting is sufficient to ratify; and the
vote may either be taken at a special election for that purpose or at a general
election. If approved, the charter goes into effect sixty days after the election.
As a final step to the formation procedure, the city clerk duly seals and certi-
fies the charter and a copy is also sent to the Nebraska secretary of state,
NEB. CONST. art. XI, § 2. If the electorate rejects the charter, the mayor and
council may repeat the process within six months. The procedure may be
repeated until a charter is finally approved. Id. § 3.
The charter can be amended on a motion passed by the city governing
body which is approved by a majority of the electors. The qualified electors,
"in number not less than 5% of the next preceding gubernatorial vote," may
also initiate a charter amendment which is submitted to the council or gov-
erning authorities. Id. § 4. The amendment is then submitted to the voters at
the next general election "or special election not held within thirty days after
such petition is filed." Id. Either the voters, through the initiative, or the
council can submit the question "Shall a charter convention be called?" to the
voters. If approved by a majority of the voters, a convention must be intiated
through a "special election ordinance." Id.
16. Id. § 5.
17. Id. § 2.
1980]
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And no such charter or charter amendment shall diminish the tax rate for
state purposes fixed by act of the Legislature,.or interfere in any wise with
the collection of state taxes.
18
The remainder of article XI is devoted to procedural language
designed to facilitate the self-executing features of Nebraska home
rule. Of course, it should also be noted that Nebraska home rule
cities are limited in their actions by other provisions of the Ne-
braska and United States constitutions by both the specific lan-
guage of these basic laws19 and the construction of that language
through court interpretation, as are all other governments in the
state.
Three procedures are available for Nebraska home rule charter
amendment: (1) proposals of a charter convention, referred to the
voters; (2) piecemeal amendment by a city council, referred to the
voters; and (3) piecemeal amendment, using the initiative process,
also using the referendum.20
Both Lincoln and Omaha converted their statutory charters
into home rule charters through the action of their founding char-
ter conventions in 1917 and 1922, respectively. After this initial ac-
tion, their charters were amended piecemeal. Since 1917 Lincoln
has added 144 charter amendments, 21 and Omaha 12.22
18. Id. § 4.
19. See Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 58, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614 (1942). For
example, the due process clauses of both the United States and Nebraska
Constitutions serve to limit the authority of the cities.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. Table I
Number of Amendments to Lincoln Home Rule Charter
of 1917: By Charter Topical Heading
1918- 1978
Charter Topical Heading & Article Number Number
I. Prior Corporate Entity Preserved 1
II. General Powers of the City 22
III. Elections and Qualifications of Electors and Officers 2
IV. Elections and Organization of Administration Recall, Initiative
and Referendum 29
V. Ordinances 1
VI. Utilities 2
VII. Contracts 8
VIII. Streets, Public Improvements, Public Utilities, Special Assess-
ments 29
IX. Finance and Taxation 27
IXA. Merit System 8
IXB. Planning Department 12
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In 1956, Omaha radically changed her 1922 charter and con-
X Human Rights 2
XI. Section 1. When Charter in Force
Section 2. Purpose of Catchheads
Section 3. Effective Date 1
TOTAL: 144
Charter, LINcoLN MuNrcinA CODE.
Table II
Number of Amendments to Lincoln Home Rule Charter
of 1917: By Year 1918 - 1978
Year Number Year Number
1918 1 1962 18
1919 5 1963 2
1922 1 1966 25
1934 1 1968 1
1935 2 1970 2
1943 1 1973 1
1949 2 1974 4
1954 2 1975 1
1956 5 1978 6
1959 64 TOTAL: 144
Id.
22. Table III
Number of Amendments to Omaha Home Rule Charter of 1956:
by Charter Topical Heading 1956 - 1978
Charter Topical Heading & Article Number Number
1. Incorporation: Form of Government, Powers of the City,
Corporate Limits 0
I. The Council and Legislation 0
III. The Executive Branch 0
IV. Boards, Commissions and Authorities 0
V. Finance 3
VI. Personnel 3
VII. Planning 2
VIII. Miscellaneous, General 0
IX. Transitional Provisions
X. 3
XI. 1
TOTAL: 12
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verted from the commission to the strong mayor from of govern-
ment. The changes were accomplished by a convention which was
assembled according to the constitutional prescription.2 3
The objectives which guided the 1956 Omaha Charter Conven-
tion are stated in the prefatory section of the new charter and ap-
pear as follows:
The new Charter abandons the Commission form of government under
which Omaha has operated for many years and proposes in its place the
Mayor-Council form. Among the many reasons contributing to this deci-
sion are the desires:
1. To separate the executive and legislative functions as is done in both
the national and state governments.
2. To clearly fix and identify executive and administrative responsibility
and authority.
3. To simplify the government structure so that the citizen may readily
identify and locate responsibility.
4. To bring tried and proven administrative organization and procedures
into our city government.
5. To create a government that would be both responsive and responsible
to the people.
2 4
In addition to changing Omaha's form of government, the 1956
convention performed an interesting bit of legal legerdemain with
certain selected portions of the 1922 charter. Article VIII of the
1956 charter contains the following changes:
1. Designated provisions of the 1922 charter are to be reduced to the sta-
tus of ordinances and incorporated into the municipal code under the
1956 charter.
Charter, OMAHA MUNICIPAL CODE AND CHARTER, I-LXX.
Year Amendments per Year
1957 4
1964 1
1966 4
1967 1
1970 2
Data extrapolated from id.
23. Id. at I.
24. Id.
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2. Designated provisions of the 1922 charter are to be expressly repealed,
and
3. Designated sections of the 1922 charter, all of which derive their force
and effect from the fact that they are laws of the State ...and provisions
of the . . .Charter of 1922 . . . shall not in the future have force and ef-
fect as charter provisions.
2 5
Omaha citizens who were adversely affected by the changes
wrought by the trifold classification in Article VIII brought suit
challenging the changes. The Nebraska Supreme Court held
[ilt was legally competent for the qualified voters of the city to make des-
ignated and properly identified provisions of the prior 1922 home rule
charter of the city a part of the new 1956 home rule charter of the city so
that they would be applicable to and would govern and control local affairs
of the city as duly enacted ordinances containing the identical subject
matter as the designated provisions could have done until the designated
provisions were superseded by ordinances of the city which the council of
the city was by the charter of the city authorized to enact.2 6
In the early 1960's, after approximately a decade of discussion
and prodding from various civic groups and leaders, the Lincoln
City Council, having decided that certain major charter changes
were desirable, authorized the establishment of a body which
would accomplish the same tasks as a constitutionally prescribed
form of charter convention, but which would be convened and re-
port to the council itself rather than directly to the voters. This
new body was called the "Charter Revision Committee," and the
results of its labors brought forth a new form of city government
for Lincoln, similar to the one in Omaha.27 The Charter Revision
Committee's reorganization work is reflected by the fact that of the
eighteen amendments passed in 1962, thirteen dealt with elections
and administrative organization, and one dealt specifically with
the form of government. 2 8 Lincoln accomplished governmental re-
organization through a modest schedule of revisions rather than
re-writing a totally new charter as Omaha did. Lincoln has em-
ployed the services of Charter Revision Committees several times
since reorganization in 1962.29
As a final word on Nebraska home rule charter development,
25. Id., art. VIII.
26. Molner v. City of Omaha, 169 Neb. 44, 57, 98 N.W.2d 33, 41 (1959).
27. Since before 1917, the form of Lincoln's government was the commission
form, as was Omaha's. Local pundits had termed that form "the Three-
Headed Monster."
28. See note 16 supra.
29. It did so in 1966 and again in 1973. The 1966 Committee's proposals resulted
in the adoption of 25 charter amendments which were designed primarily to
correct "inconsistencies" caused by conversion from the commission to the
strong mayor form of government. The Committee also submitted five
amendments designed to "harmonize the Charter with statutes adopted by
the 1965 Legislature." See Report of the Charter Revision Committee of the
City of Lincoln (February 1, 1966).
1980]
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perhaps the only remarkable or novel things discovered were a
provision in the Lincoln charter authorizing a municipal gasoline
station 30 and the details of Omaha's conversion of certain charter
provisions to the status of municipal ordinances.3 1
IV. NEBRASKA HOME RULE CITY STATUTORY CHARTERS
Except for the excerpted annotations from court decisions,
nothing in the current Nebraska statutes gives firm recognition to
the fact that the cities of Omaha and Lincoln operate under home
rule charters.32 The Omaha chapter declares that cities of the Met-
ropolitan Class shall be "governed by this Act. '33 The Lincoln
30. Local folklore credits Mayor Charles Bryan with the idea. He was tremen-
dously displeased with the high prices charged for gasoline by one of the oil
companies which operated stations in Lincoln. See, Charter, LINCOLN MUNICI-
PAL CODE art. VIII, § 13b. The municipal station operated from the 1920's un-
til 1966.
31. See notes 25-26 & accompanying text supra.
32. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-101 to -2004 (Reissue 1977), governing metropolitan
class cities serves as the Omaha statutory charter. Id. §§ 15-101 to -1307, gov-
erning primary class cities, serves as the Lincoln charter.
33. § 14-101.
Table IV
Statutory Charter Articles: City of Omaha;
in Nebraska Code
Article Topic
1 General Powers.
2 Officers, Elections, Bonds, Salaries. Recall of Officers, Initiative,
Referendum.
3 Public Improvements.
(a) Streets and Sidewalks. Repealed.
(b) Viaducts. Repealed.
(c) Sewerage, Drainage, Sprinkling, Paving Repair and Con-
tractors' Bonds.
(d) Eminent Domain; City Planning Board.
(e) Building Restrictions. Repealed.
(f) Parks, Recreational Areas, and Playgrounds.
(g) Streets and Highways.
(h) Special Assessment Bonds.
4 City Planning, Zoning.
5 Fiscal Management, Revenue and Finances.
(a) General Provisions.
(b) Municipal Bonds for Various Purposes.
(c) Street Improvement; Bonds; Grading; Assessment.
(d) City Treasurer.
(e) Taxation.
(f) Investments; Supplies; Official Newspaper.
6 Police Department.
(a) General Provisions.
(b) Police Relief and Pension Fund. Repealed.
[Vol. 59:601
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chapter merely states the population limits and announces that
cities within those limits shall be "known as cities of the Primary
Class." 3 4 By inference, this suggests that Omaha's home rule sta-
7 Fire Department
8 Miscellaneous Provisions.
9 Water Department.'
10 Water Districts.
11 Metropolitan Utilities District.
12 Interstate Bridges.
13 Municipal University.
14 Housing Authority. Repealed.
15 Peoples Power Commission Law. Repealed.
16 Slum Clearance. Transferred to Chapter 19, article 26.
17 Parking Authority.
(a) Parking Authority Law of 1955.
(b) Parking Facilities.
(c) Off-Street Parking.
18 Metropolitan Transit Authority.
19 Urban Renewal. Repealed.
20 Landmark Heritage Preservation Districts.
Id. §§ 14-101 to -2004 (Reissue 1977).
34. Id. § 15-101.
Table V
Statutory Charter Articles: City of
Lincoln; in Nebraska Code
Article # Topic
1 Incorporation, Extensions, Additions, Wards, Consolidation.
2 General Powers.
3 Officers, Elections, Employees.
4 Council and Proceedings.
5 Water Department.
6 Contracts and Franchises.
7 Public Improvements.
8 Fiscal Management, Revenue and Finances.
9 City Planning, Zoning.
10 Pensions.
11 Planning Department.
12 Appeals.
13 Community Development.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 15-101 to -1307 (Reissue 1977).
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tus is legally "unknown," but that Lincoln's home rule status is tac-
itly admitted, through omission.
As with the home rule charter texts, the Lincoln and Omaha
statutory charters follow different formats and seem to reflect dif-
ferent topical emphases. For example, the Lincoln act includes
two articles relating to planning while the Omaha law covers the
same topic with one.35 In the area of fire and police administration,
the Omaha statute contains a separate article for each,3 6 but the
Lincoln statute ignores both departments. Another distinguishing
feature of the Omaha act is the inclusion of statutory charters for
four public corporations which are legally independent of the mu-
nicipality of Omaha.37 None of them can constitutionally enjoy
home rule status in Nebraska. In neither the Omaha nor Lincoln
statutory charters is the specific organizational form of govern-
ment mentioned.
Two additional large blocs of applicable legislation are found in
code chapters 18 and 19 respectively, entitled: "Cities and Villages,
Laws Applicable to All" and "Cities and Villages: Laws Applicable
to More Than One And Less Than All Classes." In addition, there
are a myriad of state statutes which would qualify as legislative
charter components for Nebraska home rule as well as non-home
rule cities; some of these would include Chapter 11, "Bonds and
Oaths, Official," Chapter 12, "Cemeteries," Chapter 47, "Jails" and
Chapter 51, "Libraries and Museums."
Yet another important feature of the Lincoln and Omaha statu-
tory charters deserves comment: each is the only city in its popu-
lation bracket class, an arrangement which predates both cities'
conversion to home rule status. Moreover, since the beginning of
the century, the legislature has adjusted the population limits of
Primary and Metropolitan class cities so as to bar competitive cit-
ies from inclusion into either category. As will be seen from the
tabulation below, it appears that the major competitor with Omaha
was Lincoln. Legislators may have anticipated that Grand Island
would reach eligibility for primary city status unless the popula-
35. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-401 to -419 (Reissue 1977) with id. §§ 15-901 to
-905 & §§ 15-1101 to -1106.
36. Id. §§ 14-601 to -620; id. §§ 14-701 to -708.
In the current edition of the state statutory code the Omaha legislative
charter covers 238 pages while the Lincoln charter is contained in 103 pages.
37. Metropolitan Utilities District, id. §§ 14-1101 to -1117 (Reissue 1977); Metropol-
itan Transit Authority, id. §§ -1801 to -1826; Omaha Parking Authority, id. §§ -
1701 to -1740; Landmark Heritage Preservation Districts, id. §§ -2001 to -2004.
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tion brackets were changed. The pertinent legislative "adjust-
ments" are shown as follows:
Primary Class (Lincoln) 38  Metropolitan Class(Omaha) 39
(1901) 40,000 - 100,000 (1921)-100,000 inhabitants or more
(1947) 40,000 - 150,000 (1947) 150,000 inhabitants or more
(1961) 40,000 - 200,000 (1961) 200,000 inhabitants or more
(1965) 100,000 -300,000 (1965) 300,000 inhabitants or more
Municipal reformers, including those who propose home rule,
have long criticized both special legislation and classification sys-
tems which in effect produce the same results. 40 But others con-
clude that the use of special legislation or a classification system
which may place but one city in a bracketed class is a desirable
arrangement because it makes possible "tailor-made" legislation
designed to deal with problems peculiar to one city. The Nebraska
Constitution prohibits special legislation;4' but the Nebraska
Supreme Court has, on several occasions, announced its approval
of the existing classification system for cities. For example, as far
back as 1884, Chief Justice Cobb said:.
There may not be more than one city [Lincoln] now in the state to which
its provisions apply; but should our population continue to increase in the
future ... it is reasonably safe to predict that before the end of the pres-
ent decade there will be twenty. If an act is to be deemed inimical to the
provision of the constitution above referred to, [Article II, section 18]
simply because in point of fact its operation is confined to one city, then it
would folow that our only city of the first class [Omaha] is utterly without
legal corporate existence-a state of things which could not have been
intended by the framers of the constitution ... .42
In 1905, the supreme court again held that population classifica-
tions do not constitute special legislation even though only one
city in the state falls within the particular class. 43
Generally, the Nebraska legislature has not gone out of its way
to pass laws displeasing to either Lincoln or Omaha. Perhaps the
fact that both cities use lobbyists to keep watch at the state capitol
accounts for the generally peaceful relationship. The record, how-
ever, is not entirely satisfactory from the municipal viewpoint be-
cause, from time to time, individual or ad hoc legislative blocs
press for passage of acts which are undesirable to the home rule
cities. For example, one of the most recent conflicts arose when an
Omaha senator decided to push for ward or district elections in-
38. See 1965 Neb. Laws 327; 1961 Neb. Laws 215; 1947 Neb. Laws 170; 1901 Neb.
Laws 71.
39. See 1965 Neb. Laws 327; 1961 Neb. Laws 218; 1947 Neb. Laws 170; 1921 Neb.
Laws 398.
40. E.g., Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota, 7 MMN. L. REv. 133 (1923);
Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936).
41. NEB. CONST. art. IiI, § 18.
42. State v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 77, 19 N.W. 470, 471-72 (1884).
43. State v. Malone, 74 Neb. 645, 105 N.W. 893 (1905).
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stead of at-large elections for Omaha city council members.44 Soon
thereafter, a member of the Lincoln delegation introduced a simi-
lar bill.45 Newspaper comment at the time noted that "Senator
Wally Barnett, who introduced the bill, said ... that Lincolnites
do not feel represented under the present system. '46 In response,
a Lincoln city council member queried: "Is this what we have the
[sic] look forward to-our state senators dictating to us what we
can and cannot put in our charter?" 4 7 The cities won the battle but
subsequently lost the war; in 1979, the Omaha charter was
amended by the legislature to require elections by district.48
One criticism of the statutory charter system is that it wastes
legislative resources. All Nebraska cities-in addition to Lincoln
and Omaha-are governed by the statutory charter applicable to
their population bracket. Most of these cities seem content to
work together and apply political pressure through their various
interest groups, professional organizations and the League of Ne-
braska Municipalities. Lincoln and Omaha also receive certain
beneficial support from the same groups; but, because of their
unique status, they not only are required to keep a "weather eye"
peeled on general legislative matters applicable to all or some cit-
ies, but they also must lobby to keep their statutory charters from
being changed in an objectionable manner. The net result of home
rule status, therefore, is to increase the lobbying work-load and ex-
pense of Lincoln and Omaha as compared with other state munici-
palities. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal any advantages
to this system, with the possible exception of some intangible pres-
tige stemming from the possession of the home rule label.
V. NEBRASKA HOME RULE AND THE COURTS
It was early established that "[i] t is emphatically, the province
and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is .... If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each."49 This principle may have led to the attenuat-
ing development of home rule in Nebraska. The constitutional
home rule amendment requires the charters to be "subject to the
constitution and laws of this state ... ,,"50 and the first supreme
44. L.B.12, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. (1973).
45. L.B.448, id.
46. The Lincoln Star, Feb. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
47. Id.
48. See L.B. 329, 1979 Neb. Laws 1005. Lincoln voters, meanwhile, approved a
combination at-large and district system for selecting city council members
in 1978.
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
50. NEB. CONsT. art. XI, § 2.
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court pronouncement on a home rule charter question held that
"laws of this state" were "any general statute."'5 1 The overall effect
of court decisions touching home rule charter actions is to trans-
form the decisions into the "laws of this state." In any common
law jurisdiction, when charter provisions conflict with statutes
over a long enough period of time and embrace a sufficient number
of municipal functional, organizational and jurisdictional phenom-
ena, a body of law emerges as controlling. Not only did the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's exercise in judicial law-making begin to
erode the purposes of home rule through the injection of new rules
which reduced municipal freedom of choice, but the process was
further hastened when judges incorrectly employed precedents
enunciating principles of state-city relationships which existed
prior to the advent of home rule. This long term strategy moved
the law toward restoration of the state as sovereign, with a resul-
tant weakening of the local autonomy which home rule constitu-
tional amendments were intended to provide.
A. The Municipal Affairs Doctrine
Missouri's pioneering contribution to the development of home
rule includes interpretive opinions handed down by its supreme
court. The first significant opinion dealt with a conflict between
the home rule charter of St. Louis and a state statute.52 In deciding
the case the court spoke of "municipal matters" as those which le-
gally fell within the purview of the home rule charter. "Municipal
matters" were later characterized as "matters of municipal govern-
ment," "matters of municipal concern," "municipal affairs," "local
matters," and "matters of local concern." The particular term em-
ployed will of course vary according to the preferences of individ-
ual judges and commentators, but each alludes to those municipal
functional, organizational and jurisdictional phenomena which
present themselves as so peculiarly local in nature that they may
be properly controlled by a home rule charter rather than a stat-
ute. In 1904, the Missouri Supreme Court first distinguished "mat-
ters of local concern" from "matters of statewide concern" and
suggested that state acts would overturn municipal ordinances
only if an ordinance attempted to trespass on the realm of state-
wide concern.5 3 On its face the new doctrine seemed to make plau-
sible and useful distinctions but only a year later a member of the
same court expressed disssatisfaction with its newly-created
''state-local concern" rule:
51. Schroeder v. Zehrung, 108 Neb. 573, 576, 188 N.W. 237, 238 (1922).
52. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64 (1884).
53. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 598, 84 S.W. 914, 918 (1904).
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II]t is extremely unfortunate that this Court ever attempted to solve the
problem by drawing a distinction between matters of mere local concern
and matters of state concern, and to say that as to matters of mere local
concern the municipality has power to legislat , to my mind, no fixed, cer-
tain, general or intelligible rule can be formulated upon such a distinction,
which will answer or solve the problems that will arise.
5 4
This expression of judicial regret was apparently too late: the
municipal affairs doctrine had in just one year been recognized
and accepted as an adequate guideline in other home rule states
and has continued to be used in all jurisdictions where home rule
charter documents rest as foundation pieces of a home rule sys-
tem.55 In Nebraska, displeasure with the rule was expressed five
years after the establishment of home rule in Lincoln by Judge
Ridick: "It is not easy. . . in all cases to distinguish between mu-
nicipal and state powers, and when they come within the classifica-
tion of police powers, they are as impossible of accurate definition
as the police power itself .... We must therefore content our-
selves with the consideration of each case as it arises, applying
those principles which precedent and logic approve. '5 6 The judici-
ary may consider the municipal affairs doctrine a "bitter pill to
swallow," but it is one it has swallowed. As each new confronta-
tion between a home rule charter and the statutes has appeared,
the court has reluctantly applied the municipal affairs doctrine.5 7
The ultimate effect of the doctrine, which has no basis in the con-
stitutional language of the home rule amendment, has been to
amend the amendment in such a way as to undermine its basic
purpose.58
B. The Doctrine of Municipal Affairs-Subsidiary Rules
The courts have expanded and elaborated the municipal affairs
doctrine, further increasing the power and expanding the scope of
state legislative control while reducing the power and narrowing
the scope of the charter city's jurisdiction. As first applied,59 the
state-local distinction simply considered the merits of a case on
the basis of "state concerns" versus "local concerns." Two decades
later, the Nebraska Supreme Court introduced the distinction be-
tween "matters which are purely of local concern" and those of
54. State v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83, 104, 88 S.W. 41, 44 (1905). Fur-
ther commentary on Missouri home rule may be found in Euston & Johnson,
The Status of Municipal Home Rule Charters in Missouri: Analysis of the Ef-
fect of the 1971 Constitutional Amendment, 30 J. Mo. B. 281 (1974).
55. This is not the case in states such as Kansas which do not use a locally-
framed home -rule charter document.
56. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 58, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (1922).
57. See Figure 1 of text infra.
58. Application of the municipal affairs doctrine has had the same effect in other
states: for example, Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio and Oklahoma.
59. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (1904).
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statewide concern.60 As one opinion puts it: "As to all subjects of
strictly [purely] local municipal concern such charter cities oper-
ate free and independent of state legislation."61 To a casual ob-
server, the use of the words '"purely" or "strictly" may seem to be
of no legal significance; but further reflection reveals that "purely"
or "strictly" effectively subdivides the phrase "municipal concern"
or "local concern" so as to evoke its logical opposite, "not purely"
or "not strictly" of local or municipal concern. However, in actual
practice, when the Nebraska Supreme Court decides to shear
away more home rule authority, it avoids accentuating the nega-
tive and refrains from using the phrases "not purely" or "not
strictly" a matter of municipal or local concern. Instead, it in-
troduces a more positive construction and speaks of laws "affect-
ing municipal affairs, but which [are] also of state concern .... -62
Subjects which fall within the mixed "municipal/state" category
will be regulated by the state legislature. But that did not always
seem to be exactly the court's position. In Consumers Coal Co. v.
City of Lincoln,63 the court outlined what might be considered an
invitation to home rule cities to experiment widely in many hereto-
fore forbidden areas of legislative domain. The court stated, "the
city may ... under the Constitution provide for the exercise by
the council of every power connected with the proper and efficient
government of the municipality, including those powers so con-
nected, which might lawfully be delegated to it by the legislature,
without waiting for such legislation."64 Similarly, in State v. City of
Lincoln,65 the court said, "The purpose of section 2, art. XI... was
to render such cities as nearly independent as possible of state leg-
islation."66 But neither Judge Ridick in 192267 nor Justice Bos-
laugh, who quoted Judge Ridick's two opinions with approval in a
1959 opinion,68 apparently really meant that home rule cities
should venture very far into legislative regions traditionally
guarded by the state. Judge Ridick, in closing the panegyric en-
couraging home rule innovation, added one cautionary point which
essentially nullified a substantial portion of the invitation: he indi-
60. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51,58, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (1922).
Synonymous with the phrase, "purely of local concern" are several others,
including, "strictly local municipal concern," as in Axberg v. City of Lincoln,
141 Neb. 55, 58, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1942) and "strictly municipal concern," in
Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 488, 234 N.W. 87, 90 (1930).
61. Niklaus v. Miller, 159 Neb. 301, 308, 66 N.W.2d 824, 829 (1954).
62. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 58, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1942).
63. 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
64. Id. at 58-59, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (opinion by Ridick, J.).
65. 137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 499 (1939).
66. Id. at 101, 288 N.W. 499, 501.
67. Notes 56, 62 & accompanying text supra.
68. Mollner v. City of Omaha, 169 Neb. 44, 48-49, 98 N.W.2d 33, 36-37 (1959).
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cated that the home rule charter "may provide for the exercise of
power on subjects, connected with municipal concerns, which are
also proper for state legislation, but upon which the state has not
spoken, until it speaks."69 Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court,
though willing to offer comforting words to home rule cities, is pre-
pared to support state legislative preemption.7 0
C. The Area of Statewide Concern
Looking for guidelines in matters of statewide concern, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Axberg turned to the words of an Ohio
state tribunal's opinion, perhaps to lend a touch of variety to an
otherwise routine pronouncement:
The state, considered in relation to its subdivisions, is the imperium
and as such by its very nature has state control in state affairs. Since the
municipality is imperium in imperio only in the exercise of powers con-
ferred upon it by the state Constitution, it must in all other respects be
subordinate to state authority. If fire, police and health departments be
deemed purely matters of local self-government, they could be abolished
and the state would be unable to step in. Obviously the abolishment of
any or all of them would affect state interests. So would even impairment.
Indeed, police and fire protection and health preservation are essential to
the administration of state government in such a way as to accomplish
vital purposes expressed in its organic law ... The Constitution guaran-
tees life, liberty and property and imposes upon the state the duty to pro-
tect and defend these rights. That duty does not end at city limits.
Control of deadly, contagious diseases may often require uniform state
action; prevention of fire may be ineffective without unified effort reaching
into urban, suburban and rural sections; and the policing of the state
might well be inadequate to public need if done by a state constabulary
with power to act only in areas outside municipalities. The state must re-
main sovereign in all such affairs else its authorities cannot protect rights
assured to its citizens by its Constitution. These are fundamental reasons
why police, fire and health undertakings are essentially attributes of state
sovereignty and matters of state-wide concern-7 1
It can be inferred from this passage that matters of statewide con-
cern are partially congruent with the areas regulated by the police
powers. As might also be expected, the powers of eminent domain
and taxation-both attributes of state sovereignty-are now ex-
69. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 59, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (1922)
(emphasis added). See also Mollner v. City of Omaha, 169 Neb. 44, 98 N.W.2d
33 (1959).
70. For example, in Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942),
Justice Carter vehemently rejected the notion that firemen's pensions should
be brought under charter control. In fact, he merely "slides by" the conten-
tion that municipal concern exists in that area at all. Chief Justice Simmons
and Justice Messmore each authored a dissent which firmly disagreed with
the majority. Id. at 65, 66, 2 N.W.2d at 618, 618. Justice Rose concurred with
each.
71. Id. at 59, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1942) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138
Ohio 220, 231-32, 34 N.E.2d 226, 232 (1941)).
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eluded from regulation by home rule charter provisions. Exclusive
state regulation of eminent domain has "always been upheld as a
state prerogative.7 2 As for taxation, in 1959 the court reversed the
position it had taken in Eppley Hotels Co. v. City of Lincoln7 3 by
limiting the cities' powers to tax.7 4 In addition to police powers,
eminent domain and taxation, a number of other subjects are ex-
cluded from the home rule legislative jurisdiction. Some can be
rationally defended under the statewide interest label; and others
seem to be excluded as a reminder to anyone concerned that
"whether an act of the Legislature [or a charter provision] pertains
to a matter of local or statewide concern" is a judicial question.75
VI. HOME RULE AND THE COURTS: SPECIFIC
APPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Figure 1 shows that since 1925, the Nebraska judiciary has con-
sistently increased areas of statewide concern and reduced the
reach of home rule charters. Of the thirty-six cases studied,
twenty represent findings for the state and fifteen for home rule
cities. Moreover, while the cities won more cases than they lost
until the mid 1950's, the state's winnings have steadily increased in
both numbers and percentages-decade by decade. 76
72. See Van Patten v. City of Omaha, 167 Neb. 741, 94 N.W.2d 664 (1959); State v.
Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945); Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144
Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943).
73. 133 Neb. 550, 276 N.W. 196 (1937).
74. Consumers Pub. Power Dist. v. City of Lincoln, 168 Neb. 183, 187, 95 N.W.2d
357, 360 (1959), suggests strongly that no room exists for further experimenta-
tion by home rule cities in this area: "Municipalities have only such power of
taxation as are specifically granted by the Legislature.... This appears so
fundamental that a citation of authority seems unnecessary."
75. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 58, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1942).
76. Cases Won:
Decades For Local Concern For Statewide Concern
1925-35 5 2
1935-44 4 5
1945-54 3 2
1955-64 2 8
1965-74 1 3
Totals: 15 20
Purposely omitted from Figure 1 is Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W.
547 (1937) which harmonized a home rule-statutory conflict.
Included in the tabulation are thirty-one cases which represented direct
adversary proceedings between state and local authority and five cases which
are used simply because they contained descriptions of what is a statewide or
a local concern. Except for Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung, 11 F.2d 887 (8th Cir.
1925), all cases were decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
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Figure 1
MATTERS OF LOCAL CONCERN AND MATTERS OF
STATEWIDE CONCERN AS RELATED TO NEBRASKA
HOME RULE CITIES: COURT DECISIONS FROM
1925 TO THE PRESENT
Court Decision
Mutual Oil Co. v.
Zehrung, 11 F.2d 887 (8th
Cir. 1925).
Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243,
207 N.W. 172 (1926).
Salsbury v. City of Lin-
coln, 117 Neb. 465, 220
N.W. 827 (1928).
State v. Johnson, 117
Neb. 301, 220 N.W. 273
(1928).
Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120
Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87
(1930).
Omaha and Council
Bluffs Street Ry. v. City
of Omaha, 125 Neb. 825,
252 N.W. 407 (1934).
Pester v. City of Lincoln,
127 Neb. 440, 255 N.W. 923
(1934).
Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb.
535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937).
Eppley Hotels Co. v. City
of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550,
276 N.W. 196 (1937).
State v. City of Lincoln,
137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 497
(1939).
State v. the Araho, 137
Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545
(1940).
Munch v. Tusa, 140 Neb.
457, 300 N.W. 385 (1941).
Axberg v. City of Lincoln,
141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613
(1942).
Matter in Question
the sale of gasoline by the city is a
proper function of local government
the sale of gasoline by the city does
not violate the Nebraska Constitution
improvement of streets, alleys and
highways within city is strictly of mu-
nicipal concern
"In authorizing [airport] bonds upon
a majority vote, Home Rule Charter
makes a conflicting state statute inap-
plicable."
education is a matter of state and not
of strictly municipal concern
regulation of mass transportation by
common carriers is a matter of state
concern
the extension of a water main and the
assessment of real estate are matters
of local and municipal concerns
the court has a duty to harmonize
state and municipal legislation con-
cbrning liquor traffic
city taxes to be used strictly for city
purposes are a matter of municipal
and not state concern
dismissal of fireman is purely of local
concern
control of horse race gambling is a
question of statewide interest
there is no legislation on Omaha
firemen's pensions except the provi-
sions of the Omaha home rule charter
firemen's pensions are matters of
statewide concern
Category
Upheld
Locala
Locala
Local
Local
State
State
Local
Concurrent
Local
Local
Statea
Local
State
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Nagle v. City of Grand
Island, 144 Neb. 67, 12
N.W.2d 540 (1943).
Lickert v. City of Omaha,
144 Neb. 75, 12 N.W.2d 644
(1944).
McMaster v. Wilkinson, -
145 Neb. 39, 15 N.W.2d 348
(1944).
State v. City of Grand
Island, 145 Neb. 150, 15
N.W.2d 341 (1944).
State v. Butler, 145 Neb.
638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945).
Sullivan v. City of Oma-
ha, 146 Neb. 297, 19
N.W.2d 510 (1945).
Michelson v. City of
Grand Island, 154 Neb.
654, 48 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
Niklaus v. Miller, 159
Neb. 301, 66 N.W.2d 824
(1954).
State v. Cunningham, 158
Neb. 708, 64 N.W.2d 465
(1954).
Omaha Parking Authori-
ty v. City of Omaha, 163
Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862
(1956).
Simpson v. City of Grand
Island, 166 Neb. 393, 89
N.W.2d 117 (1958).
Consumers Public Power
District v. City of Lin-
coln, 168 Neb. 183, 95
N.W.2d 357 (1959).
Mollner v. City of Oma-
ha, 169 Neb. 44, 98 N.W.2d
33 (1959).
Van Patten v. City of
Omaha, 167 Neb. 741, 94
N.W.2d 664 (1959).
Dell v. City of Lincoln,
170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d
62 (1960).
eminent domain proceedings are mat-
ters of statewide concern
pension rights of Omaha police are to
be determined by charter provisions
of the city
a contest over the election of a munic-
ipal official is a matter of statewide
concern
the firemen's pension law is a matter
of statewide concern applicable to all
cities, whether home rule or not
eminent domain is a matter of state
concern
the pension rights of firemen in the
city of Omaha are to be determined
from the home rule charter of the city
health and sanitation are matters of
statewide concern
the extension of a water main is a
matter of local and municipal con-
cern-same would be true where con-
struction of reservoir is involved
the right to pave the streets of a home
rule city is purely of local character
city streets are necesiarily part of the
highway system of the state and are
therefore a matter of general rather
than strictly local concern
the law concerning police dismissals
is related to the maintenance of law
and order and thus of statewide con-
cern
the power to tax is a matter of state-
wide concern
adoption of a particular form of gov-
ernment [dictum]
eminent domain
statutes which are enacted for the
transfer or protection of property
rights are of statewide concern
State
Local
State
State
State
Local
State
Local
Local
State
State
State
Local
State
State
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Metropolitan Utility Dis-
trict v. City of Omaha,
171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d
397 (1961).
State v. Johnson, 175
Neb. 498, 122 N.W.2d 240
(1963).
Midwest Employers
Council Inc. v. City of
Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131
N.W.2d 609 (1964).
Wolf v. City of Omaha,
177 Neb. 545, 129 N°W.2d
501 (1964).
State v. Lynch, 181 Neb.
810, 151 N.W.2d 278
(1967).
City of Millard v. City of
Omaha, 185 Neb. 617, 177
N.W.2d 576 (1970).
Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas
Public Building Commis-
sion, 188 Neb. 30, 195
N.W.2d 236 (1972).
State v. Leahy, 189 Neb.
92, 199 N.W.2d 713 (1972).
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the operation of a sewer system is a
matter of statewide concern
sanitation and health are matters of
statewide concern
labor relations and practices, civil
rights, are of statewide concern
city zoning is a matter of local con-
cern
the legislature did not intend that the
county board act as a quasi-judicial
body to review and determine ques-
tions of legality or procedural budget-
ary requirements of a home rule city
"[tlhe amendment or repeal of a city
charter is a municipal matter. ..
The dissolution of the corporation is a
matter of state concern."
a statute authorizing establishment of
a building commission pertains to a
matter which is of state concern and
not strictly a municipal affair
the detachment of territory from a
municipal corporation, like annexa-
tion, is a matter of statewide concern
a Case which does not involve a home-rule-charter-versus-statutory conflict.
A. Matters of Local Concern-The Current Picture
Of the various municipal functions and jurisdictional areas
tested through litigation, there are now only five which remain as
properly approved matters of local or municipal concern for Ne-
braska home rule cities. These are: (1) authority to sell gasoline
at retail,77 (2) control of water systems and reservoirs,7 8 (3) power
to select organizational form of government for home rule cities,7 9
77. Such a provision can be found in the Lincoln charter. See Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N.W. 172 (1926).
78. Niklaus v. Miller, 159 Neb. 301, 66 N.W.2d 824 (1954); Pester v. City of Lincoln,
127 Neb. 440, 255 N.W. 923 (1934).
79. See Mollner v. City of Omaha, 169 Neb. 44, 98 N.W.2d 33 (1959); State v. City of
Lincoln, 137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 499 (1939).
State
State
State
Local
Locala
State
Statea
State
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(4) zoning authority,80 and (5) the municipal budgetary process.8 1
Since the supreme court approved charter control in four of the
six cases dealing with fire and police personnel pension systems, it
might be inferred that this particular area was securely protected
as a matter of local concern. However, close inspection of the
cases shows that only Omaha-based actions were won; both the
Grand Island 82 and Lincoln 83 cases were declared to be matters of
statewide concern as the result of legislative preemption. It
seems, therefore, that Omaha was allowed to regulate fire and po-
lice personnel pension systems only because the legislature has
not yet chosen to preempt the area. Furthermore, if the legislature
does decide to write a covering statute for Omaha, Axberg v. City
of Lincoln84 will provide ample authority to overturn the four
Omaha cases.
As has already been pointed out, reduction of home rule au-
thority seems to be furthered by judicial use of the adjectives
"purely" and "strictly" as modifiers of "municipal affairs" or "local
affairs." But in actual experience, that does not seem to be the
case. Of the five areas which still remain within the province of
home rule charters, none was denoted as "purely" or "strictly" a
local or municipal matter. Contrariwise, those municipal activities
which were considered of purely local or municipal concern when
they were first judicially reviewed, upheld and declared to be im-
mune from legislative preemption, have, without exception been
"converted" to matters of statewide concern.85
B. Matters of Statewide Concern-The Current Picture
In a Wisconsin home rule decision, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court observed, "When is an enactment of the legislature of state
wide concern? We find no answer to this question in any decision
of any court in this country."86 Since that question was asked over
forty years ago, when home rule was a much younger idea, per-
80. Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
81. State v. Lynch, 181 Neb. 810, 151 N.W.2d 278 (1967).
82. State v. City of Grand Island, 145 Neb. 150, 15 N.W.2d 341 (1944).
83. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1943).
84. 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1943).
85. Originally upheld as properly within the purview of home rule charters were:
dismissal of city employees in State v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 97, 102, 288
N.W. 497, 502 (1939) ("purely of local concern"); bond elections in State v.
Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 303, 220 N.W. 273 (1928) (a matter which dealt "with
municipal affairs alone"); taxes in Eppley Hotels Co. v. City of Lincoln, 133
Neb. 550, 557, 276 N.W. 196, 200 (1937) (" matter of municipal concern"); street
administration in State v. Cunningham, 158 Neb. 708, 712, 64 N.W.2d 465, 467
(1954) ("purely local in character"); Salsbury v. City of Lincoln, 117 Neb. 465,
468, 220 N.W. 827, 828 (1928) ("strictly of municipal concern").
86. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 67, 267 N.W. 25, 28 (1936).
1980]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
haps the court really was puzzled. Today, however, in the domain
of Nebraska home rule, nearly every municipal function, organiza-
tional component, or jurisdictional matters merely appears to be
waiting its turn to be placed in the category of statewide concern.
Furthermore, to date, no case exists where a Nebraska court has
reversed itself and shifted a municipal matter from the "statewide"
into the "local concern" category.
The following have been held to be matters of statewide con-
cern by the Nebraska Supreme Court:
I. Matters Relating to Attributes of Sovereignty
A. Eminent Domain 87
B. Taxation
88
C. Police Powers
1. Education 89
2. Control of liquor 90
3. Control of gambling
91
4. Protection of life and property92
5. Health and sanitation 93
6. Labor relations regulation
94
II. Regulation of Public Utilities 95
III. Local Government Regulation
A. Elections 96
B. Dissolution of Municipal Corporations 97
C. Annexation
98
D. Personnel Actions 99
E. Streets10 0
F. Public Buildings
10 1
87. Van Patten v. City of Omaha, 167 Neb. 741, 94 N.W.2d 664 (1959); State v. But-
ler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945); Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144 Neb.
67, 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943).
88. Consumers Pub. Power Dist. v. City of Lincoln, 168 Neb. 183, 95 N.W.2d 357
(1959).
89. Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930).
90. Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937).
91. State v. The Araho, 137 Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545 (1940).
92. Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62 (1960); Simpson v. City of
Grand Island, 166 Neb. 393, 89 N.W.2d 117 (1958); State v. City of Grand Island,
146 Neb. 150, 15 N.W.2d 341 (1944); Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2
N.W.2d 613 (1942).
93. State v. Johnson, 175 Neb. 498, 122 N.W.2d 240 (1963); Metropolitan Util. Dist.
v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961); Michelson v. City of
Grand Island, 154 Neb. 654, 48 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
94. Midwest Employers Council Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N.W.2d
609 (1964).
95. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 825, 252
N.W. 407 (1934).
96. State v. Johnson, 175 Neb. 498, 122 N.W.2d 240 (1963); McMaster v. Wilkinson,
145 Neb. 39, 15 N.W.2d 348 (1944).
97. City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 185 Neb. 611, 177 N.W.2d 576 (1970).
98. State v. Leahy, 189 Neb. 92, 199 N.W.2d 713 (1972).
99. Simpson v. City of Grand Island, 166 Neb. 393, 89 N.W.2d 117 (1958).
100. Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).
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In Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha,0 2 the Nebraska
Supreme Court shifted street administration from home rule char-
ter to statutory jurisdiction. The opinion, written by Justice
Carter, seems to develop as follows: (1) Parking areas are con-
nected to alleys, (2) Alleys are connected to streets, (3) And
streets are connected to state highways. Therefore, since the state
has the power to "establish, maintain, and control the highways of
the state, including those within corporate limits .... "103 and,
since the highways are connected to the city streets; and the
streets are connected to the alleys; and the alleys are connected to
parking areas; it follows that state authority follows these physi-
cally connected components of the state highway system and thus,
the entire system is also a matter of statewide concern. One might
suggest that Mr. Justice Carter developed a new anti-home rule
doctrine which could be called, "the knee-bone-connected-to-the-
thigh-bone" rule.10 4 And, with a modicum of additional imagina-
tion, the doctrine could be employed to dismantle the five remain-
ing judicially-approved areas of local concern.
C. Analysis
Based upon decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court, the fol-
lowing general juridical principles apply to home rule cities:
1. Home rule charters must conform to the federal and state constitu-
tions.
2. Home rule charters are to be construed as grants of power from the
state, not limitations of power.
3. In matters purely or strictly of local concern, home rule charter provi-
sions take precedence over state legislation.
4. In matters of municipal concern, which are also of statewide concern,
home rule charter provisions govern, unless preempted by state legis-
lative acts.
5. In matters of statewide concern state legislative acts govern.
6. It is a matter for the courts to decide whether a home rule charter pro-
vision or a state legislative act applies in any given case.
There is, today, no area which has been designated a matter of
strictly or purely local concern which has not been shifted to the
statewide classification. It follows then, that those areas which
have been denoted as matters of local or municipal concern in
prior court decisions, are, on the basis of rule four above, subject to
101. Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Pub. Bldg. Comm'n., 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236
(1972).
102. 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).
103. Id. at 105, 77 N.W.2d at 869.
104. With apologies to the composer of the "spiritual" from which the phrase is
taken.
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legislative preemption whenever the time is ripe. Accordingly, for
all practical purposes, home rule in Nebraska does not really exist.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The statement, "Home rule does not really exist in Nebraska,"
is, from a legal standpoint, essentially correct. Yet, throughout the
state, few people know or understand the significance of that fact;
and even fewer are upset by it. The city governments of Lincoln
and Omaha seem reasonably content with the status quo; and
neither seems inclined to consider another form of government as
desirable. When conflicts threaten because of differences between
a statutory provision and the text of the home rule charter, Lincoln
and Omaha leaders now work through political channels rather
than taking the matter to court.
A. Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Despite the high degree of political competence of home rule
leadership, there are some indications of dissatisfaction in the
home rule centers of the state. Evidence of a desire to "tidy up"
the home rule problem surfaced in a recent attempt to amend the
constitutional home rule provision.105 An article in a Lincoln
newspaper noted that Lincoln and Omaha "collaborat[ed] on a
proposal to amend the state Constitution so that cities with home
rule charters [could] enjoy all powers that the Legislature doesn't
specifically prohibit."'106 The article quotes Lincoln and Omaha
city lobbyists as saying that "right now home rule charter cities
have only those powers that are granted to them by the Legisla-
ture.1 07 The story also indicated political support for the pro-
posed amendment from the League of Nebraska Municipalities.
At first glance, it seems that the proposed constitutional
amendment might serve to eliminate the problem. But, on further
examination, the proposal seems to contain several flaws. First, it
focused on a legislative rather than a judicial solution, and second,
the change in the text of the constitution would have required trav-
ersing a tedious and difficult path with results which would not
change a thing. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincolno 8 states a
rule almost identical to the proposed amendment:
We hold that the city may by its charter under the Constitution provide
for the exercise by the council of every power connected with the proper
and efficient government of the municipality, including those powers so
connected, which might lawfully be delegated to it by the legislature, with-
105. L.B.917, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980) (the bill died in committee).
106. Lincoln Journal, January 22, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
107. Id.
108. 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
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out waiting for such delegation. It may provide for the exercise of power
on subjects, connected with municipal concerns, which are also proper for
state legislation, but upon which the state has not spoken, until it
speaks. 1
0 9
It should be pointed out that the language of the court actually has
greater practical legal force than that of the proposed amendment
because a judicial pronouncement spells out the last word in con-
stitutional interpretation. It has obviously not been recognized by
some that the heart of the problem lies neither in the textual ade-
quacy of the constitution nor in the passage just quoted. The prob-
lem lies in the fact that most supreme court decisions since 1922
have retreated from the position taken in Consumers Coal. Both
the spirit and the letter of the rule have been ignored or effectively
nullified.
Therefore, if home rule is to be revitalized through a change in
the constitution, the change must provide a means of forcing the
Nebraska judiciary to allow home rule cities greater latitude in
providing solutions to problems that are, in fact, really "local."
B. Another Alternative: Kansas Model
In a few states (North Carolina, for one), a long history of ami-
cable, cooperative, associations between cities and the state gen-
eral assembly make municipal home rule a matter of little
interest." 0 In other states, notably Arizona, California and Colo-
rado-whose home rule systems resemble Nebraska's-state judi-
cial tribunals have been much less inclined to protect state
legislative "preserves" and have frequently given very broad
meaning to "matters of local concern."'1 1 But there are also state
home rule systems which are not so dependent upon judicial ap-
proval. One such state is Kansas. A brief description of the essen-
tials of the Kansas home rule plan is outlined for the benefit and
consideration of those who are interested in improving home rule
in Nebraska.
Kansas home rule was launched by a 1960 constitutional
amendment which passed and became effective in 1961.112 The
system includes many features different from Nebraska's.
109. Id. at 58, 189 N.W. at 646.
110. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 269, 312 (1960).
111. See generally 2 McQuLiiN, supra note 1, §§ 4.89 to .113.
112. Kansas home rule is based on the Wisconsin model; but the governmental
researchers responsible for developing the Kansas home rule amendment in-
vestigated the Wisconsin home rule experience thoroughly, discovered its de-
fects and designed the Kansas plan in such a manner as to avoid Wisconsin's
mistakes. It appears from the record to date that they have been successful.
See Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation
and Home Rule, 20 KAN. L. R.v. 631 (1972).
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It includes all cities.113 Unlike Nebraska and a number of com-
panion states with population qualifications, all Kansas cities are
given the opportunity to participate in the home rule plan. More-
over, the scope and quantitative aspects of participation depend
entirely upon the desires of the individual city, its people and its
city officials.
It does not require cities to "frame" individual home rule char-
ters. Participation in Kansas home rule is, for the most part, con-
fined to the actions of individual city councils following prescribed
constitutional guidelines. Thus, Kansas municipalities are not put
to the trouble and expense of electing charter convention mem-
bers, framing suitable home rule charters, presenting such char-
ters to the electorate for approval or following any of the
traditional home rule establishment scenario which is required in
Nebraska and other traditional home rule states.114
It is self-executing. 115 No legislative or gubernatorial approval
is required for it to go into effect. No implementary state laws
need be passed to set up procedures. No local voter approval is
necessary in order to activate the home rule plan. No charter must
be passed, because no charter document is required for the system
to work.
It mandates liberal judicial interpretation. Precise constitu-
tional language points the Kansas judiciary to the proper approach
to be used in home rule cases: "Powers and authority granted cit-
ies pursuant to this section shall be liberally construed for the pur-
pose of giving to cities the largest measure of self-government.""16
It permits cities to exempt themselves from legislative acts. By
passing what is constitutionally entitled a "charter ordinance," a
Kansas city council can exempt its municipality from the jurisdic-
tional impact of any non-uniform state legislative act." 7 The
"charter ordinance" must be labeled as such, must name the stat-
ute from which the city is to be exempted and must be passed by a
two-thirds vote. "Charter ordinances" may not be used to nullify
statutes relating to: (1) municipal incorporation, (2) annexation,
(3) consolidation and (4) dissolution; nor may they be used against
legislative acts establishing municipal debt or certain tax limita-
tions.
113. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5.
114. E.g., Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, Oklahoma and Oregon.
115. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5(c) (1).
116. Id. § 5(d). One commentator contends: "Perhaps most important, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court can afford to construe article 12, section 5 broadly in favor
of local initiative because it knows that the state legislature may always ne-
gate local action if it sees fit." Clark, supra note 112, at 662.
117. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5(c) (1).
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The key word to an understanding of the "charter ordinance" is
"uniform." Although the Kansas constitution permits the state to
set up four classes of cities, the state judiciary has held that an act
applicable to one or several of the four classes is not a uniform act
within the meaning of the home rule article." 8 Therefore, a "char-
ter ordinance" can prevail against even such an act." 9 During the
first decade of Kansas home rule, the cities passed, on the average,
approximately 70 "charter ordinances" per year-with over 200 cit-
ies participating. 2 0
It permits cities to take legislative initiative without prior state
delegation of authority. The significance of the preceding words is
that in Kansas, Dillon's Rule has become a "dead letter." The es-
sence of Dillon's Rule, named for the Iowa judge who wrote it, is
that no municipality-home rule or non-home rule-is to be per-
mitted to legislate or perform any action which is not precisely in
pursuance of statutory law.12 1 In non-home rule cities that means
a state legislative act; and in home rule jurisdictions of the conven-
tional variety, it may mean either in pursuance of a state statute or
a home rule charter provision. The Kansas home rule article de-
clares:
Cities are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and govern-
ment including the levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exac-
tions ... by ordinance[s] passed by the governing body with
referendums only in such cases as prescribed by the legislature, subject
only to enactments of the legislature of statewide concern applicable uni-
formly to all cities .... 122
A survey of Kansas case law from 1961 to the present gives con-
vincing support for the assertion that Kansas courts have followed
118. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 509 P.2d 1130 (1973).
119. This is true even if the city passing the "charter ordinance" is within the class
covered. For additional comments, see Clark, supra note 87, at 656-658.
120. Id. at 658.
121. Dillon's Rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second those necessar-
ily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to th accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation,--not simply convenient, but indis-
pensable. Any fair, reasonable substantial doubt concerning the
existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation,
and the power is denied.
J. DILLON, MUICIPAL CoR'oAIONS, § 237(89) (5th ed. 1911) (emphasis ad-
ded), reprinted in VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNmENT LAw 85 (1975).
It has been noted that judicial adherence to the spirit of Dillon's Rule ac-
counted in large part for the lack of progress in home rule development in
Nebraska. See Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A Progress Report? 36 NEB. L.
REV. 447 (1957).
122. KAN. CoNsT. art. 12, § 5(b).
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fairly closely the constitutional "mandate" to interpret liberally
the home rule article so as to give cities a great amount of discre-
tion. That position is also supported by Clark, who comments:
The key to understanding home rule in Kansas is that cities are free to
experiment with all kinds of imaginative legislation 'subject only to enact-
ments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities. . . .' The magic
words--'subject to'-mean that local ordinances to solve local problems
are supported ... unless ... they conflict with a state statute. 2 3
The total effect of Kansas home rule is drastically to alter the
traditional position of local governmental units vis d vis the state.
In most states local governments are purely and simply "creatures
of the state" as noted in Hunter v. City ofPittsburgh.2 4 In Kansas,
the home rule article establishes what amounts to nearly a federal
relationship: the cities of Kansas now legislate under a law which
allows them to do what is not prohibited. They enjoy merely a lim-
itation on their powers; they are no longer constrained by Dillon's
Rule which envisages the municipal charter as a "grant of
power."' 2 5 The Kansas home rule article does not confer sovereign
status on the cities; but it does permit them sufficient latitude so
that they can perform competitively with the sovereign state legis-
lature-as if they were sovereigns. Thus, they can qualify as hav-
ing quasi-sovereign status.
123. Clark, supra note 112, at 660.
124. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
125. See Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
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